proxygen's HTTP/3 codec buffered an incomplete non-DATA frame, such as a control-stream frame, a frame of an unknown or reserved type, or a HEADERS frame, until its entire declared length had arrived, without limiting that length, and re-scanned all buffered data each time more bytes arrived. A remote, unauthenticated HTTP/3 peer could declare a very large frame and deliver it slowly, causing unbounded memory growth and CPU usage that grows quadratically with the number of fragments, leading to denial of service. This issue affects proxygen versions prior to v2026.11.09.00.

WordPress SureForms plugin <= 2.13.0 - Broken Access Control vulnerability

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Brainstorm Force SureForms sureforms allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects SureForms: from n/a through 2.13.0.

WordPress Element Pack Elementor Addons plugin <= 10.0.4 - Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in BdThemes Element Pack Elementor Addons bdthemes-element-pack-lite allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Element Pack Elementor Addons: from n/a through 10.0.4.

Apache XML Graphics Batik: Cross-Site Scripting via Unencoded Font Metadata in Apache Batik SVGFont

A Cross-Site Scripting via Unencoded Font Metadata in Apache Batik SVGFont. This issue affects Apache XML Graphics Batik: through 1.19. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.20, which fixes the issue.

Authorization bypass in the Git Sync provisioning jobs API

A user with the Editor role could delete, move, push or pull Git Sync managed resources in folders where they only had view access, by creating a provisioning job through the jobs resource API, which skipped the folder permission checks (incorrect authorization).

Team preferences RBAC bypass through the set-home-dash endpoint

Any authenticated user, including a Viewer, could change the preferences of any team, such as its home dashboard, theme and timezone, through an undocumented endpoint with no access control, and so redirect every member of that team to a dashboard of their choice (missing authorization).

CWE- 416: Use After Free vulnerability exists that could cause arbitrary code execution when a local attacker could trick the end user to open a specially crafted malicious SSD file.

Default OpenBMC Root Credential Reintroduced After Reset to Defaults in ThinkSystem v4 XCC3

An internal security review identified a development regression from ThinkSystem v4 XClarity Controller 3 (XCC3) versions (2.51) IHX432Y to (2.56) IHX436K which re-introduces the default OpenBMC root password upon performing an XCC Reset to Default operation.  An attacker can gain access to enabled administrative interfaces of XCC using the default OpenBMC credential re-introduced after Reset to Default. Additionally, this provides access to the underlying XCC Operating System which is not normally accessible. Only these versions are affected and are no longer available for download. Process enhancements have also been made to prevent and identify potential future regression.

TimePictra Stored Cross-site Scripting

A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in Microchip the TimePictra platform could allow an authenticated, low-privileged attacker to store malicious script content that executes when another user views the affected page

TimePictra root password hardcoded in installation files

A hard-coded root password in Microchip TimePictra platform installation files could allow an attacker with access to those files to obtain privileged credentials

TimePictra ermote code execution via file upload

An unrestricted upload of files with dangerous type vulnerability in the Microchip TimePictra platform allows functionality not properly constrained by access control lists, potentially resulting in remote code execution.

Probo: Broken access control in public e-signature API

Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Prior to version 0.224.0, the public Trust Center GraphQL API exposes acceptElectronicSignature and recordSigningEvent, both gated only by @authentication(required: PRESENT) @sessionOnly — any self-provisioned trust center identity can call them. The underlying esign.Service.AcceptSignature and esign.Service.recordEvent build the tenant scope from the client-supplied signatureId GID (coredata.NewScopeFromObjectID(req.SignatureID)) and load the signature by that GID. At no point do they verify that the signature belongs to the caller or that the caller's email matches the signature's SignerEmail. As a result, any authenticated trust-center visitor who possesses another visitor's signature GID can: (1) complete that visitor's NDA signature — overwriting signer name/IP/UA with attacker data and setting status to Accepted, which triggers the sealing worker to generate a completion certificate; (2) inject arbitrary audit-trail events into any signature's log. Both attacks defeat the non-repudiation and integrity guarantees of the e-signature system. This issue has been patched in version 0.224.0.

Probo: Vertical privilege escalation

Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Prior to version 0.224.0, an organization ADMIN can mint an OWNER membership via createUser, bypassing the owner-only set-owner authorization gate. This issue has been patched in version 0.224.0.

Probo: Unauthenticated cross-tenant and hidden-item disclosure via Query.node in the public Trust Center API

Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Prior to version 0.224.0, the public Trust Center GraphQL API exposes Query.node(id:) with @authentication(required: OPTIONAL) — an unauthenticated internet visitor to any published trust center can call it. Six of its type branches — Organization, Framework, Audit, ThirdParty (subprocessor), TrustCenter, and TrustCenterReference — resolve the object with a tenant scope derived from the client-supplied GID itself (coredata.NewScopeFromObjectID(id)) and load it with a bare Get(scope, id) that performs no comparison to the current trust center's OrganizationID and no showOnTrustCenter/visibility check. (The Document and File branches, by contrast, correctly pass trustCenter.OrganizationID and check visibility). This issue has been patched in version 0.224.0.

ideon: Unauthenticated /api/links/preview endpoint is an open SSRF relay, and its IP blocklist misses the 0.0.0.0/:: unspecified-address bypass

ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.5, ideon's link-preview endpoint requires no authentication at all and forwards any URL a caller supplies straight into a server-side fetch. The app does have a general-purpose SSRF guard (safeFetch/validateSafeUrl in src/app/lib/ssrf.ts), but this route sits behind no login check whatsoever, making it a fully open, anonymous URL-fetch relay - and the guard's IP blocklist itself has a gap that lets it reach the server's own loopback interface via the 0.0.0.0 "any address" bypass, a well-documented SSRF-filter evasion technique on Linux. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.5.

Heym - Horizontal IDOR: get-by-id on workflow/node templates skips the visibility check the list path enforces

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, get_workflow_template / get_node_template fetches a template by ID with no visibility / author / shared_with predicate, so any authenticated user can read (and use) any other tenant's private (visibility=specific_users) template — including its full node/edge graph and the email addresses it was shared with. The list endpoint enforces visibility correctly; the single-item get/use paths do not. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.

Heym: Missing role gate in team-member management lets any member add/remove members, exposing team-shared credentials

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, team-member management (add / remove / update) is gated only on team membership, not on the team creator/admin role — and TeamMember has no role column. Any non-creator member can seat an attacker account into the team; because credential team-shares are scoped only by TeamMember.user_id, the newly-added attacker can then decrypt every credential shared into that team (provider API keys, OAuth tokens. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.

Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.

Heym: Playwright Custom Code Backend RCE via `playwrightCode` Field

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.71, Heym's workflow engine accepts an arbitrary Python code string in the playwrightCode field of a Playwright node. This string is written to a temporary .py file and executed directly by the backend process via subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, script_path]) with no sandboxing, AST validation, or role gate. Any authenticated user — including a freshly registered account — can achieve full remote code execution (RCE) on the backend host, running as the service process user (observed as root in the default Docker deployment). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.71.

Heym: Command execution via POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools stdio transport: supplied command is spawned before MCP validation

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75.