Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| heymrun | heym | affected |
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| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Heymrun | Heym |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.642% probability within 30 days)
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Heymrun
Heymrun heym |
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| Vendors & Products |
Heymrun
Heymrun heym |
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| Description | Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70. | |
| Title | Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-269 CWE-94 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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