Heym: Command execution via POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools stdio transport: supplied command is spawned before MCP validation
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| heymrun | heym | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Heymrun | Heym |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.618% probability within 30 days)
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Heymrun
Heymrun heym |
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| Vendors & Products |
Heymrun
Heymrun heym |
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| Description | Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75. | |
| Title | Heym: Command execution via POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools stdio transport: supplied command is spawned before MCP validation | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-94 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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