crypto: asymmetric_keys - fix OOB read in pefile_digest_pe_contents

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: asymmetric_keys - fix OOB read in pefile_digest_pe_contents pefile_digest_pe_contents() computes the trailing-data hash length as pelen - (hashed_bytes + certs_size). A crafted PE can make the addition exceed pelen, causing the unsigned subtraction to underflow to ~4 GiB. This is passed to crypto_shash_update() which reads out of bounds and panics on unmapped vmalloc guard pages. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900038d8000 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:sha256_blocks_generic (lib/crypto/sha256.c:152) Call Trace: <TASK> __sha256_update (lib/crypto/sha256.c:208) crypto_sha256_update (crypto/sha256.c:142) verify_pefile_signature (crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:436) kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig (kernel/kexec_file.c:151) __do_sys_kexec_file_load (kernel/kexec_file.c:406) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Validate that the addition does not overflow and the result does not exceed pelen before the subtraction. Return -ELIBBAD on failure.

audit: fix incorrect inheritable capability in CAPSET records

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: fix incorrect inheritable capability in CAPSET records __audit_log_capset() records the effective capability set into the inheritable field due to a copy-paste error. Every CAPSET audit record therefore reports cap_pi (process inheritable) with the value of cap_effective instead of cap_inheritable. This silently corrupts audit data used for compliance and forensic analysis: an attacker who modifies inheritable capabilities to prepare for a privilege-escalating exec would have the change masked in the audit trail. The bug has been present since the original introduction of CAPSET audit records in 2008.

MONAI: MONAILabel Server Crash and Silent Inference Corruption via Crafted DICOM (pydicom DS/IS Validation Bypass)

MONAI (Medical Open Network for AI) is an AI toolkit for health care imaging. Prior to 1.6.1, PydicomReader._get_affine() trusts non-finite values in the DICOM PixelSpacing, ImagePositionPatient, and ImageOrientationPatient fields and composes them into an affine matrix without validation. An unauthenticated attacker who can upload a crafted DICOM to a default MONAILabel deployment can propagate NaN or infinity values through LoadImaged, Spacingd, model inference, and output writing, causing inference failures, persistent datastore poisoning, or geometrically corrupted results. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.1.

In multiple functions of ubsan_throwing_runtime.cpp, there is a possible UBSan failure due to an integer overflow. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Io.undertow/undertow: undertow: http response header integrity issue due to character truncation

A flaw was found in Undertow, an HTTP server, within its HTTP response header writing path. The `writeString()` method performs a silent narrowing cast from 16-bit Unicode characters to 8-bit bytes when writing HTTP response header values. A remote attacker can exploit this by supplying specific Unicode characters in user-controlled input that an application places into response headers. This can lead to the truncation of these characters into ASCII control characters or special symbols, potentially resulting in limited integrity impact or information disclosure if the application does not properly sanitize user input.

Gix-date: gix-date: undefined behavior due to invalid string generation

A flaw was found in gix-date. The `gix_date::parse::TimeBuf::as_str` function can generate strings containing invalid non-UTF8 characters. This issue violates the internal safety invariants of the `TimeBuf` component, leading to undefined behavior when these malformed strings are subsequently processed. This could potentially result in application instability or other unforeseen consequences.

Libssh: incorrect return code handling in ssh_kdf() in libssh

A flaw was found in libssh versions built with OpenSSL versions older than 3.0, specifically in the ssh_kdf() function responsible for key derivation. Due to inconsistent interpretation of return values where OpenSSL uses 0 to indicate failure and libssh uses 0 for success—the function may mistakenly return a success status even when key derivation fails. This results in uninitialized cryptographic key buffers being used in subsequent communication, potentially compromising SSH sessions' confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Postgresql: memory disclosure in aggregate function calls

A memory disclosure vulnerability was found in PostgreSQL that allows remote users to access sensitive information by exploiting certain aggregate function calls with 'unknown'-type arguments. Handling 'unknown'-type values from string literals without type designation can disclose bytes, potentially revealing notable and confidential information. This issue exists due to excessive data output in aggregate function calls, enabling remote users to read some portion of system memory.

Tesseract: GENERIC_2D_ARRAY DeSerializeSize signed integer comparison bypass allows negative dimensions

Tesseract is an open source OCR engine. Prior to 5.5.4, GENERIC_2D_ARRAY::DeSerializeSize in src/ccstruct/matrix.h reads matrix dimensions as signed int32_t values and compares them only with UINT16_MAX, allowing negative values to reach ResizeNoInit. Negative dimensions or a 65535 by 65535 product can create inconsistent allocation state and later out-of-bounds accesses while loading a crafted traineddata file, causing denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 5.5.4.

Chrome Permissions Miscalculation Allows Remote Attacker to Bypass System Access

Incorrect calculation in Permissions in Google Chrome prior to 156.0.8078.47 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)

MariaDB Connector/J: Length-encoded integers larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE were truncated before being used as lengths

MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.10, the ReadableByteBuf.readLength() and ReadableByteBuf.readIntLengthEncodedNotNull() methods narrowed the protocol's unsigned 8-byte length-encoded integer to a Java int without checking that the value fit a non-negative integer. Values above Integer.MAX_VALUE could wrap to a negative or unrelated length that downstream allocation and read paths used. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could trigger NegativeArraySizeException, out-of-bounds failures, or oversized allocation behavior in client connection handling. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.10.

Zimbra Collaboration Suite Shared-File Mailbox Quota Accounting Error Enables Quota Exhaustion

A mailbox quota-accounting vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) allows an authenticated user to consume another user’s mailbox quota by repeatedly sharing and revoking a document. Creation of the recipient’s shared-file record charges the document size to mailbox-wide usage. Revocation deletes the record and reverses its folder counters without reversing the mailbox-wide charge. Repeated normal share notifications therefore accumulate quota usage after the visible records are gone. On accounts with a finite quota, this can prevent incoming mail and other size-increasing operations without recipient interaction. The issue affects ZCS 10.1.16 and 10.1.20.

BSON output corruption via out-of-range binary subtype bypassing UUID and OldBinary guards

A numeric-type conversion flaw in the BSON handling library of the MongoDB C# Driver allows an out-of-range binary subtype value supplied through untrusted textual input to bypass the library's binary-element integrity checks. When such a value is later encoded, it is narrowed to a smaller wire representation, producing binary elements that misdeclare their type or length. An unauthenticated party able to supply text parsed by an affected application can cause it to emit and persist malformed binary data, which subsequent readers either reject with an error or silently interpret as shorter than the data that was validated.

Botan: Integer overflow when reporting block size in FFI can cause memory corruption

Botan is a C++ cryptography library. From 2.1.0 until 3.13.0, the Botan C API function botan_block_cipher_block_size converted a size_t block size to int without a bounds check. In an application that accepts external algorithm parameter strings and uses the FFI raw ECB mode, an attacker can select the variable-block-size Lion cipher so that the reported size is truncated, the caller allocates insufficient memory, and later block processing causes memory corruption. The C++ API and normally used C API modes such as CBC and CTR are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.

net/iucv: fix the recvmsg window update

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix the recvmsg window update iucv_sock_recvmsg() sends the HiperSockets-only AF_IUCV_FLAG_WIN without testing the transport, so on a classic z/VM socket iucv_send_ctrl() sizes the skb through a NULL iucv->hs_dev. SO_MSGLIMIT accepts 1, so msglimit / 2 is zero and one recvmsg() on its own socket is enough for an unprivileged process to take a spurious disconnect. It also calls iucv_send_ctrl() under spin_lock_bh(&message_q.lock), which allocates GFP_KERNEL inside a section the code treats as atomic. Sending outside that lock lets two recvmsg() reach afiucv_hs_send() at once, where msg_recv is sampled for the advertised window and subtracted after dev_queue_xmit() -- and sendmsg reaches that counter under lock_sock() while recvmsg holds no socket lock, so both can subtract the same value, the counter goes negative and the credit reaches the peer twice. Test the transport, claim the credit with atomic_xchg() after the last error exit and hand it back if the transmit fails, and send once the lock is dropped.

flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of skb->len when computing thoff

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of skb->len when computing thoff __skb_flow_dissect() computes key_control->thoff using: key_control->thoff = min_t(u16, nhoff, skb ? skb->len : hlen); min_t(u16, ...) casts both arguments to u16 before comparing them. Whenever skb->len (or hlen) modulo 65536 is smaller than nhoff, the truncated length wins and thoff is set to a bogus small value, even when the dissection succeeded. For example, an IPv4/TCP frame with skb->len == 65540 and nhoff == 34 gets thoff == 4, so callers such as skb_probe_transport_header() point the transport header inside the Ethernet header. Such skbs are not exotic: - At the time of commit d0c081b49137 ("flow_dissector: properly cap thoff field"), AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR could already build GSO skbs larger than 64KB (MTU checks are skipped for GSO, and alloc_skb_with_frags() accepted up to MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17) order-0 pages on top of the linear part). - BIG TCP now makes skbs larger than 64KB common. - The following patch makes tun_get_user() dissect IFF_TAP frames before eth_type_trans() pulls the Ethernet header, so a GSO frame carrying a 65522..65535 byte L3 packet will be dissected with skb->len in [65536, 65549]. Compare as u32 instead. If the resulting offset cannot be represented in the u16 key_control->thoff, cap it to U16_MAX and report the dissection as failed rather than silently returning a wrong transport offset. thoff is still set on failure, as some callers (such as eth_get_headlen()) use it regardless of the return value.

flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of hlen in bpf_flow_dissect()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of hlen in bpf_flow_dissect() bpf_flow_dissect() sanitizes the offsets returned by the BPF program with clamp_t(u16, ..., hlen). If hlen is bigger than 65535, the upper bound is truncated before the comparison. For instance, with hlen == 65536, both nhoff and thoff are forced to zero, even if the program returned sane values. This is the same class of bug as the one fixed in commit 99bda1ecbd56 ("flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of skb->len when computing thoff"). That fix does not cover the BPF path, because __skb_flow_dissect() returns early when a BPF flow dissector handles the packet. struct bpf_flow_keys stores nhoff and thoff as u16, so cap hlen to U16_MAX before clamping. Found by sashiko while reviewing the commit above.

lockd: fix swapped arguments in nlmsvc_match_ip()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lockd: fix swapped arguments in nlmsvc_match_ip() When releasing locks by server IP address via /proc/fs/nfsd/unlock_ip, nlmsvc_unlock_all_by_ip() calls nlm_traverse_files() with the server sockaddr as the opaque @data argument: nlm_traverse_files(server_addr, nlmsvc_match_ip, NULL); The match callback is later invoked from nlm_traverse_locks() as: match(lockhost, host); where the first argument is the nlm_host that owns the lock, and the second argument is the @data that was originally passed down (here the server sockaddr). This is the convention every other match callback relies on (nlmsvc_mark_host(), nlmsvc_same_host(), nlmsvc_is_client()): arg1 is the real nlm_host, arg2 is the caller-supplied reference value. nlmsvc_match_ip() has had these two arguments reversed ever since the unlock-by-IP feature was introduced in commit 4373ea84c84d ("lockd: unlock lockd locks associated with a given server ip"): return rpc_cmp_addr(nlm_srcaddr(host), datap); Here @host is actually the server sockaddr, so nlm_srcaddr(host) dereferences a struct sockaddr as a struct nlm_host and reads garbage at the offset of h_srcaddr; meanwhile @datap is actually the lock owner's nlm_host but is compared as a sockaddr. As a result the comparison practically never matches and locks are not released for the requested IP. Swap the arguments so the lock owner's source address is compared against the requested server address: return rpc_cmp_addr(nlm_srcaddr(datap), (struct sockaddr *)host); [ cel: fix the misleading typedef parameter names too ]

i3c: master: Do not treat master device as a duplicate target

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: Do not treat master device as a duplicate target i3c_master_search_i3c_dev_duplicate() searches the bus for another I3C device with the same PID as the reference device. The search can match master->this, causing the controller itself to be returned as a duplicate. Since the controller is not a target device, it cannot be a duplicate of one. Exclude master->this from matching so that the function only returns real duplicate target devices.

fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix integer overflow in MFT cluster validation In ntfs_init_from_boot(), the boot sector's MFT cluster numbers are validated against the volume size with: if (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors || mlcn2 * sct_per_clst >= sectors) goto out; mlcn and mlcn2 are u64 fields read directly from the boot sector. sct_per_clst is bounded above by 4096 (true_sectors_per_clst() plus the is_power_of_2() check below it), but the multiplication is done in u64 and wraps when mlcn (or mlcn2) is large enough -- e.g. mlcn near 2^62 with sct_per_clst == 4 wraps to 0, which compares below any non-zero 'sectors', so the check is bypassed and the malformed record is accepted. The accepted mlcn is then used unchanged in sbi->mft.lbo = mlcn << cluster_bits; In practice the resulting reads fail at the block layer (sb_bread() returns NULL via grow_buffers()'s check_mul_overflow() guard), so today this manifests as mount failing in odd places rather than as something more dangerous, but the validation step is still wrong and there is no reason for callers to rely on the block layer to catch a value that should never have been accepted in the first place. Use check_mul_overflow() to compute the two sector positions and fail the mount if either multiplication wraps; this preserves the existing semantics (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors) instead of switching to division (mlcn >= sectors / sct_per_clst), which would tighten the check at edge cases where 'sectors' is not a multiple of sct_per_clst. The check_*_overflow() style is the one ntfs3 already uses for similar on-disk arithmetic in fs/ntfs3/run.c.