Bypass of GRUB lockdown restriction in Secure Boot mode via serial command MMIO base address
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| GNU | grub2 | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gnu | Grub2 |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.115% probability within 30 days)
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ssvc
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threat_severity
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threat_severity
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| First Time appeared |
Gnu
Gnu grub2 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Gnu
Gnu grub2 |
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| Description | A local attacker with control over GRUB's configuration can bypass lockdown restrictions when booting with Secure Boot and load an unsigned GRUB module, while GRUB continues to report lockdown is enabled. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of the MMIO base address passed to the GRUB serial command. GRUB does not validate that the base address corresponds to a UART device, rather than being an arbitrary memory address. This allows an attacker to trick GRUB into writing non-arbitrary data at an attacker-controlled address, including resetting the grub_file_verifiers list in a way that disables the subsequent verification of loaded modules. | |
| Title | Bypass of GRUB lockdown restriction in Secure Boot mode via serial command MMIO base address | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-822 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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