hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| hickory-dns | hickory-resolver | unaffected |
|
No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hickory-dns | Hickory-resolver |
|
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.231% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-354 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
threat_severity
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Hickory-dns
Hickory-dns hickory-resolver |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Hickory-dns
Hickory-dns hickory-resolver |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks. | |
| Title | hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| References |
|
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|