shell-quote `quote()` does not validate object-token shapes, allowing command injection via line terminators in `.op`
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| shell-quote | unaffected |
|
No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ljharb | Shell-quote |
|
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DSA |
DSA-6300-1 | node-shell-quote security update |
Github GHSA |
GHSA-w7jw-789q-3m8p | shell-quote quote() does not escape newlines in object .op values |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-8410-1 | shell-quote vulnerability |
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.793% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Ljharb
Ljharb shell-quote |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Ljharb
Ljharb shell-quote |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
threat_severity
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | shell-quote's `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal newline as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command. The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways: (1) direct construction of `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input, and (2) via `parse(cmd, envFn)` when `envFn` returns object tokens whose `.op` is attacker-influenced. Both are documented API surface. Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation: `.op` must match the parser's control-operator allowlist; `{ op: 'glob', pattern }` validates `pattern` and forbids line terminators; `{ comment }` validates `comment` and forbids line terminators; any other object shape throws `TypeError`. | |
| Title | shell-quote `quote()` does not validate object-token shapes, allowing command injection via line terminators in `.op` | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-77 CWE-78 |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|