Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| home-assistant | core | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Home-assistant | Core |
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-4ghv-53cq-7wp3 | Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.294% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Home-assistant
Home-assistant core |
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| Vendors & Products |
Home-assistant
Home-assistant core |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3. | |
| Title | Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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