CVE-2026-91085

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-91085", "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "apache", "dateReserved": "2026-09-14T17:55:38.562Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:18:12.957Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "shortName": "apache", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z"}, "title": "Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"description": "CWE-862", "lang": "en", "cweId": "CWE-862", "type": "CWE"}]}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "affected": [{"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "product": "Apache Karaf", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "lessThan": "4.4.12", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "descriptions": [{"value": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install <url> <finalname>\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.", "lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (<code>etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.&lt;scope&gt;.cfg</code>).&nbsp;<code>SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()</code>&nbsp;resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, <b>fails open</b>:&nbsp;<code>ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH</code>&nbsp;sets&nbsp;<code>passCheck = true</code>. The safety valve for this,&nbsp;<code>karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles</code>, ships commented out in&nbsp;<code>etc/system.properties</code>, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.<div><br></div><div>The shipped&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config</code>&nbsp;ACL (<code>assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml</code>, mirrored into&nbsp;<code>instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg</code>) has no&nbsp;<code>install</code>&nbsp;entry. It restricts&nbsp;<code>delete</code>&nbsp;to&nbsp;<code>admin</code>, restricts&nbsp;<code>edit</code>/<code>property-*</code>/<code>update</code>&nbsp;on the&nbsp;<code>jmx.acl.*</code>,&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*</code>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*</code>&nbsp;PIDs to&nbsp;<code>admin</code>, and allows&nbsp;<code>manager</code>&nbsp;for everything else, but&nbsp;<code>config:install</code>&nbsp;was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the&nbsp;<code>viewer</code>&nbsp;role.</div><div><br></div><div><span>config:install &lt;url&gt; &lt;finalname&gt;</span>&nbsp;fetches&nbsp;<code>url</code>&nbsp;and writes it into&nbsp;<code>${karaf.etc}</code>&nbsp;as&nbsp;<code>finalname</code>. It calls&nbsp;<code>PathUtils.checkWithin()</code>&nbsp;to block&nbsp;<code>..</code>&nbsp;traversal outside&nbsp;<code>karaf.etc</code>, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:&nbsp;<code>users.properties</code>,&nbsp;<code>keys.properties</code>,&nbsp;<code>host.key</code>, and all&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*</code>&nbsp;files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With&nbsp;<code>-o</code>/<code>--override</code>, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.</div><div><br></div><div>Because&nbsp;<code>felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}</code>&nbsp;(<code>etc/config.properties</code>), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any&nbsp;<code>.cfg</code>&nbsp;file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.</div><div><br></div><div>By contrast,&nbsp;<code>bundle:install</code>,&nbsp;<code>feature:install</code>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<code>kar:install</code>&nbsp;are all&nbsp;<code>admin</code>-only in their own ACLs, and&nbsp;<code>config:delete</code>&nbsp;is&nbsp;<code>admin</code>&nbsp;in this same ACL,&nbsp;<code>config:install</code>&nbsp;was the outlier.</div><h3>Mitigation</h3><div>Add&nbsp;<code>install = admin</code>&nbsp;in&nbsp;<code>etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg</code>&nbsp;(create the file is absent), and/or set&nbsp;<code>karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin</code>&nbsp;in&nbsp;<code>etc/system.properties</code>&nbsp;(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.</div>"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt", "tags": ["vendor-advisory"]}], "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "Textual description of severity", "content": {"text": "moderate"}}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Rin Ray <rindilray@gmail.com>", "type": "reporter"}], "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"}}, "adp": [{"title": "CVE Program Container", "references": [{"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "shortName": "CVE", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T09:15:47.789Z"}}, {"metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 6.3, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"}}, {"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-10-01T14:17:41.304608Z", "id": "CVE-2026-91085", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:18:12.957Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CVE Program Container", "references": [{"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "shortName": "CVE", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T09:15:47.789Z"}}, {"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 6.3, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"}}, {"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-91085", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-10-01T14:17:41.304608Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:15:06.530Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin", "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Rin Ray <rindilray@gmail.com>"}], "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "Textual description of severity", "content": {"text": "moderate"}}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "product": "Apache Karaf", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "lessThan": "4.4.12", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "references": [{"url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt", "tags": ["vendor-advisory"]}], "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install <url> <finalname>\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (<code>etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.&lt;scope&gt;.cfg</code>).&nbsp;<code>SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()</code>&nbsp;resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, <b>fails open</b>:&nbsp;<code>ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH</code>&nbsp;sets&nbsp;<code>passCheck = true</code>. The safety valve for this,&nbsp;<code>karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles</code>, ships commented out in&nbsp;<code>etc/system.properties</code>, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.<div><br></div><div>The shipped&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config</code>&nbsp;ACL (<code>assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml</code>, mirrored into&nbsp;<code>instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg</code>) has no&nbsp;<code>install</code>&nbsp;entry. It restricts&nbsp;<code>delete</code>&nbsp;to&nbsp;<code>admin</code>, restricts&nbsp;<code>edit</code>/<code>property-*</code>/<code>update</code>&nbsp;on the&nbsp;<code>jmx.acl.*</code>,&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*</code>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*</code>&nbsp;PIDs to&nbsp;<code>admin</code>, and allows&nbsp;<code>manager</code>&nbsp;for everything else, but&nbsp;<code>config:install</code>&nbsp;was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the&nbsp;<code>viewer</code>&nbsp;role.</div><div><br></div><div><span>config:install &lt;url&gt; &lt;finalname&gt;</span>&nbsp;fetches&nbsp;<code>url</code>&nbsp;and writes it into&nbsp;<code>${karaf.etc}</code>&nbsp;as&nbsp;<code>finalname</code>. It calls&nbsp;<code>PathUtils.checkWithin()</code>&nbsp;to block&nbsp;<code>..</code>&nbsp;traversal outside&nbsp;<code>karaf.etc</code>, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:&nbsp;<code>users.properties</code>,&nbsp;<code>keys.properties</code>,&nbsp;<code>host.key</code>, and all&nbsp;<code>org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*</code>&nbsp;files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With&nbsp;<code>-o</code>/<code>--override</code>, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.</div><div><br></div><div>Because&nbsp;<code>felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}</code>&nbsp;(<code>etc/config.properties</code>), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any&nbsp;<code>.cfg</code>&nbsp;file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.</div><div><br></div><div>By contrast,&nbsp;<code>bundle:install</code>,&nbsp;<code>feature:install</code>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<code>kar:install</code>&nbsp;are all&nbsp;<code>admin</code>-only in their own ACLs, and&nbsp;<code>config:delete</code>&nbsp;is&nbsp;<code>admin</code>&nbsp;in this same ACL,&nbsp;<code>config:install</code>&nbsp;was the outlier.</div><h3>Mitigation</h3><div>Add&nbsp;<code>install = admin</code>&nbsp;in&nbsp;<code>etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg</code>&nbsp;(create the file is absent), and/or set&nbsp;<code>karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin</code>&nbsp;in&nbsp;<code>etc/system.properties</code>&nbsp;(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.</div>", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-862", "description": "CWE-862"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "shortName": "apache", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-91085", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-01T14:18:12.957Z", "dateReserved": "2026-09-14T17:55:38.562Z", "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "datePublished": "2026-09-29T08:39:33.209Z", "assignerShortName": "apache"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Apache Karaf", "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.4.12", "status": "affected", "version": "0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "source": "security@apache.org"}], "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "532915B7-A52C-450A-A6BF-0FAE4B4144CD", "versionEndExcluding": "4.4.12", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}]}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install <url> <finalname>\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default."}], "id": "CVE-2026-91085", "lastModified": "2026-10-07T20:11:43.353", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "baseScore": 6.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 3.4, "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-91085", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-10-01T14:17:41.304608Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-09-29T09:17:10.347", "references": [{"source": "security@apache.org", "tags": ["Vendor Advisory", "Mailing List"], "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"}, {"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "tags": ["Mailing List", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"}], "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org", "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-862"}], "source": "security@apache.org", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0,4.4.12)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 95.0, "confidence_source": "inferred", "scores": [{"score": 95.0, "source": "inferred"}, {"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "Apache Karaf", "source": "cna", "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation"}, "product": "karaf", "vendor": "apache"}], "created": "2026-09-29T17:15:08.743958+00:00", "updated": "2026-10-01T17:00:15.884349+00:00", "vendors": ["apache", "apache$PRODUCT$karaf"]}