CVE-2026-89720

ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

Published Sep 11, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.7 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
check has the wrong sign:

if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))

The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most

snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)

bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.

snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
(c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
embedded in.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4817-1 linux-6.12 security update
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4841-1 linux security update
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6528-1 linux security update
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8961-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9002-1 Linux kernel (NVIDIA Tegra) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9019-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9020-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9022-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9023-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9024-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9025-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9026-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9029-1 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9039-1 Linux kernel (Azure CVM) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9040-1 Linux kernel (Low Latency NVIDIA) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9066-1 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H'}

cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-125
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the check has the wrong sign: if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ, 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size). verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder() is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked. snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is embedded in.
Title ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Linux
Published
Updated
Oct 19, 2026, 8:51 AM
Reserved
Sep 11, 2026, 7:38 PM
Status
Received
Published
Sep 11, 2026, 8:20 PM
Modified
Oct 19, 2026, 9:18 AM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
Sep 11, 2026, 7:46 PM