CVE-2026-80973

ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device

Published Sep 11, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 6.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device

usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler() forwards a MIDI event using a length
byte the device supplies, with no bound and no check that the transfer
delivered that many bytes:

if (!urb->status) {
if (rt->receiver_buffer[0] == 0x10) /* midi in event */
if (midi_rt)
midi_rt->in_received(midi_rt,
rt->receiver_buffer + 2,
rt->receiver_buffer[1]);
}

receiver_buffer is a 64-byte kzalloc() buffer (COMM_RECEIVER_BUFSIZE), so
only 62 bytes follow the two-byte header. receiver_buffer[1] is a u8 the
device chooses, so a device that answers with 0x10 and a length of 0xFF
makes snd_rawmidi_receive() read 255 bytes starting two bytes into a
64-byte object. The bytes past the buffer are handed to userspace
through the rawmidi read path.

urb->actual_length is not consulted either, so a short transfer leaves
both the type byte and the length byte at their previous values and the
handler acts on stale data.

The receiver URB is submitted from usb6fire_comm_init() at probe, so the
read happens on plug with no user action; forwarding to userspace also
needs a MIDI input substream open, since usb6fire_midi_in_received()
only calls snd_rawmidi_receive() when rt->in is set.

KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), single packet from an emulated device:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snd_rawmidi_receive
Read of size 255 at addr ffff000009f64682 by task bash/183
__asan_memcpy
snd_rawmidi_receive
usb6fire_midi_in_received [snd_usb_6fire]
usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler [snd_usb_6fire]
Allocated by task 11:
usb6fire_comm_init [snd_usb_6fire]
usb6fire_chip_probe [snd_usb_6fire]
The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of
allocated 64-byte region [ffff000009f64680, ffff000009f646c0)

Reject the event when the length exceeds the bytes that follow the
header, and require the transfer to have delivered the header plus that
many bytes. The receiver URB is submitted with a 64-byte
transfer_buffer_length, so a genuine device cannot deliver an event
longer than those 62 bytes and nothing valid is dropped.

Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4817-1 linux-6.12 security update
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4841-1 linux security update
Debian DSA Debian DSA DSA-6528-1 linux security update
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8961-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9019-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9020-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9022-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9023-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9024-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9025-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9026-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9029-1 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9039-1 Linux kernel (Azure CVM) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9040-1 Linux kernel (Low Latency NVIDIA) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9066-1 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-9091-1 Linux kernel (NVIDIA Tegra) vulnerabilities
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-125
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler() forwards a MIDI event using a length byte the device supplies, with no bound and no check that the transfer delivered that many bytes: if (!urb->status) { if (rt->receiver_buffer[0] == 0x10) /* midi in event */ if (midi_rt) midi_rt->in_received(midi_rt, rt->receiver_buffer + 2, rt->receiver_buffer[1]); } receiver_buffer is a 64-byte kzalloc() buffer (COMM_RECEIVER_BUFSIZE), so only 62 bytes follow the two-byte header. receiver_buffer[1] is a u8 the device chooses, so a device that answers with 0x10 and a length of 0xFF makes snd_rawmidi_receive() read 255 bytes starting two bytes into a 64-byte object. The bytes past the buffer are handed to userspace through the rawmidi read path. urb->actual_length is not consulted either, so a short transfer leaves both the type byte and the length byte at their previous values and the handler acts on stale data. The receiver URB is submitted from usb6fire_comm_init() at probe, so the read happens on plug with no user action; forwarding to userspace also needs a MIDI input substream open, since usb6fire_midi_in_received() only calls snd_rawmidi_receive() when rt->in is set. KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), single packet from an emulated device: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snd_rawmidi_receive Read of size 255 at addr ffff000009f64682 by task bash/183 __asan_memcpy snd_rawmidi_receive usb6fire_midi_in_received [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_comm_receiver_handler [snd_usb_6fire] Allocated by task 11: usb6fire_comm_init [snd_usb_6fire] usb6fire_chip_probe [snd_usb_6fire] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000009f64680, ffff000009f646c0) Reject the event when the length exceeds the bytes that follow the header, and require the transfer to have delivered the header plus that many bytes. The receiver URB is submitted with a 64-byte transfer_buffer_length, so a genuine device cannot deliver an event longer than those 62 bytes and nothing valid is dropped. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Title ALSA: 6fire: bound the MIDI event length from the device
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Linux
Published
Updated
Oct 19, 2026, 8:45 AM
Reserved
Aug 26, 2026, 2:34 PM
Status
Received
Published
Sep 11, 2026, 8:19 PM
Modified
Oct 19, 2026, 9:17 AM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
Sep 11, 2026, 7:42 PM