dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
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| Linux | Linux | affected |
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No data.
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| Linux | Linux Kernel |
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| Linux | Linux Kernel |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Ubuntu USN |
USN-9019-1 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-9020-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.173% probability within 30 days)
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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cvssV3_1
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| Weaknesses | CWE-125 | |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
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| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key's intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller's bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public. Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected. | |
| Title | dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
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| References |
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