Termix: Hardcoded default key encrypts all OIDC/WebAuthn users' stored SSH credentials — full offline decryption from a database copy
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termix-SSH | Termix | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termix | Termix |
|
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.120% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Termix
Termix termix |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Termix
Termix termix |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Termix is a web-based server management platform with SSH terminal, tunneling, and file editing capabilities. From 1.7.0 until 2.5.1, Termix derives the keys that wrap OIDC and WebAuthn users' Data Encryption Keys from committed default strings and the public userId salt in src/backend/utils/user-crypto.ts. Because OIDC_SYSTEM_SECRET and WEBAUTHN_SYSTEM_SECRET are not configured by the project's default deployment artifacts, an attacker with an offline SQLite database copy can derive the wrapping key, recover each affected user's DEK, and decrypt stored SSH passwords, private keys, and key passphrases. Password-authenticated users are not affected by this specific key derivation path. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1. | |
| Title | Termix: Hardcoded default key encrypts all OIDC/WebAuthn users' stored SSH credentials — full offline decryption from a database copy | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-321 | |
| References |
|
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|