MCPHub: SSRF Guard Bypass via IPv6 Transition Addresses in URL Validation
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| samanhappy | mcphub | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Samanhappy | Mcphub |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.449% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Samanhappy
Samanhappy mcphub |
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| Vendors & Products |
Samanhappy
Samanhappy mcphub |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | MCPHub is a unified hub for centrally managing and dynamically orchestrating multiple MCP servers/APIs into separate endpoints with flexible routing strategies. Prior to version 1.0.32, MCPHub's SSRF guard in src/utils/ssrf.ts uses a custom isBlockedIpv6 function that only checks for loopback, link-local, unique-local, IPv4-mapped, and IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses. IPv6 transition address families -- NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16), and Teredo (2001::/32) -- are not checked. An attacker who can specify a URL for an MCP server connection can encode a private IPv4 address inside one of these IPv6 forms to bypass the SSRF guard and reach internal infrastructure. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.32. | |
| Title | MCPHub: SSRF Guard Bypass via IPv6 Transition Addresses in URL Validation | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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