SSRF protection bypass in safeurl via IPv6 addresses and unresolvable hosts
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| Slab | safeurl | unaffected |
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| Slab | safeurl | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Slab | Safeurl |
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| Slab | Safeurl |
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| Slab | Safeurl |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.480% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Slab safeurl allows an attacker who controls a validated URL to reach internal network destinations the library is configured to block. Only IPv4 addresses are matched against the reserved ranges and the blocklist. Every other address is treated as matching nothing, so a destination that is rejected in its IPv4 form is accepted when written as an IPv6 address, IPv6 entries in the blocklist never match, and a host that resolves to no IPv4 address is accepted regardless of where it points. Deployments that rely on the allowlist instead are unaffected, because there an unmatched address is rejected. This issue affects safeurl: from 0.1.0 onward. | |
| Title | SSRF protection bypass in safeurl via IPv6 addresses and unresolvable hosts | |
| First Time appeared |
Slab
Slab safeurl |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-636 CWE-918 |
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:slab:safeurl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Slab
Slab safeurl |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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