SeaweedFS: Authenticated S3 object-scope bypass in PutObjectAcl allows overwriting a different object with the same basename
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| seaweedfs | seaweedfs | affected |
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No data.
No data.
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| Seaweedfs | Seaweedfs |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.384% probability within 30 days)
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ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Seaweedfs
Seaweedfs seaweedfs |
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| Vendors & Products |
Seaweedfs
Seaweedfs seaweedfs |
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| Description | SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40. | |
| Title | SeaweedFS: Authenticated S3 object-scope bypass in PutObjectAcl allows overwriting a different object with the same basename | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-863 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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