SeaweedFS S3 OIDC Bearer authentication bypasses IAM role trust policy
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| seaweedfs | seaweedfs | affected |
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No data.
No data.
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| Seaweedfs | Seaweedfs |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.396% probability within 30 days)
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ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Seaweedfs
Seaweedfs seaweedfs |
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| Vendors & Products |
Seaweedfs
Seaweedfs seaweedfs |
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| Description | SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions 4.39 and earlier, the S3 API accepts an external OIDC JWT sent directly in the Authorization header and maps it to an IAM role without enforcing that role's trust policy, so a federated user can assume a role they are not permitted to hold. The standard STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity path rejects such a token when the role's trust policy does not trust the token's federated provider, but the direct S3 bearer path validates only the token itself and then authenticates as the mapped role and evaluates that role's attached S3 permissions. As a result, a valid OIDC user whose token would be denied the role through STS can obtain the role's S3 access, including object read, write, and delete, by presenting the raw OIDC JWT directly to the S3 API. This issue is fixed in version 4.40 | |
| Title | SeaweedFS S3 OIDC Bearer authentication bypasses IAM role trust policy | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-863 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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