Omnivore Stored Server-Side Request Forgery via the setWebhook Mutation
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| omnivore-app | omnivore | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Omnivore-app | Omnivore |
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No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.269% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Omnivore-app
Omnivore-app omnivore |
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| Vendors & Products |
Omnivore-app
Omnivore-app omnivore |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The setWebhookResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts stores the caller-supplied url without any address validation, and the file imports no validation helper. When a subscribed event fires, callWebhook in packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts issues axios.request with that url, the method and Content-Type recorded on the webhook, and a JSON body carrying the event data, so an authenticated user can make the server send repeated attacker-shaped requests to internal endpoints, including link-local metadata addresses. The request is blind: callWebhook discards the result and writes only a success line or the axios error to the server log, so the response is not returned through the API. | |
| Title | Omnivore Stored Server-Side Request Forgery via the setWebhook Mutation | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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