CVE-2026-71279

Zigbee2MQTT External JS Extension Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code Execution

Published Aug 5, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 8.1 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import, achieving remote code execution.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

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Advisories

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath() (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a `name` parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. Because path.join() resolves `../` sequences, a name such as `../../tmp/evil.js` escapes the intended extensions directory. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import(), achieving remote code execution. Requires the `enable_external_js` config option (off by default, but commonly enabled in legacy installs) and MQTT broker access, which is frequently unauthenticated in real deployments. The identical unsanitized getFilePath() is also used by the extension-removal handler, enabling arbitrary file deletion. Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import, achieving remote code execution.
Title Zigbee2MQTT - External JS Extension Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code Execution Zigbee2MQTT External JS Extension Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code Execution
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Zigbee2MQTT External JS Extension Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code Execution Zigbee2MQTT - External JS Extension Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code Execution
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Koenkk
Koenkk zigbee2mqtt
Vendors & Products Koenkk
Koenkk zigbee2mqtt
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath() (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a `name` parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. Because path.join() resolves `../` sequences, a name such as `../../tmp/evil.js` escapes the intended extensions directory. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import(), achieving remote code execution. Requires the `enable_external_js` config option (off by default, but commonly enabled in legacy installs) and MQTT broker access, which is frequently unauthenticated in real deployments. The identical unsanitized getFilePath() is also used by the extension-removal handler, enabling arbitrary file deletion.
Title Zigbee2MQTT External JS Extension Path Traversal Leading to Remote Code Execution
Weaknesses CWE-22
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
TuranSec
Published
Updated
Aug 10, 2026, 11:47 AM
Reserved
Aug 5, 2026, 12:23 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 5, 2026, 1:24 PM
Modified
Oct 23, 2026, 9:10 PM