ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| beaugunderson | ip-address | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beaugunderson | Ip-address |
|
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh | ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks |
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.480% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-1389 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Beaugunderson
Beaugunderson ip-address |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Beaugunderson
Beaugunderson ip-address |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.1.1 until 10.2.2, every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. The underlying bit comparison is correct, and mask(n) already returns the first n bits of the full parsed address independently of subnetMask; the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. This issue is fixed in version 10.2.2. | |
| Title | ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-20 CWE-918 |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|