RabbitMQ: JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rabbitmq | rabbitmq-server | affected |
|
Configuration 1 [-]
|
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rabbitmq | Rabbitmq-server |
|
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Ubuntu USN |
USN-8933-1 | RabbitMQ Server vulnerabilities |
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.418% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Broadcom
Broadcom rabbitmq Server |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:broadcom:rabbitmq_server:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Broadcom
Broadcom rabbitmq Server |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Rabbitmq
Rabbitmq rabbitmq-server |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Rabbitmq
Rabbitmq rabbitmq-server |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18, JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS (CWE-252). the JWKS key fetching mechanism in uaajwt.erl does not validate the HTTP response status code when downloading signing keys from the OAuth2 provider's JWKS endpoint. Non-200 responses (including 4xx and 5xx errors) are processed identically to successful responses. When the JWKS endpoint returns an error response with a valid-JSON body that lacks a keys field, all previously cached signing keys are destroyed, causing a persistent authentication denial of Files: deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwt.erl, lines 50-63 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/uaajwks.erl, lines 5-7 deps/rabbitmqauthbackendoauth2/src/rabbitoauth2provider.erl, lines 98-107 Bug 1: HTTP status code ignored (uaajwt.erl:50-63): The Erlang httpc module returns {ok, {{HttpVersion, StatusCode, ReasonPhrase}, Headers, Body}}. The pattern {ok, {, , JwksBody}} matches ANY successful HTTP transaction Persistent authentication DoS: Once keys are destroyed, ALL OAuth2/JWT authentication fails for all users until a new successful JWKS refresh occurs Amplification: A single attacker can deny access to all legitimate OAuth2 users across the entire RabbitMQ. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.3, 4.2.9, 4.1.14, 4.0.23, and 3.13.18. | |
| Title | RabbitMQ: JWKS Fetch Ignores HTTP Response Status Code - Signing Key Destruction Causes Authentication DoS | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-252 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|