H3C G3/G5 HDM Firmware Verification Key Replacement
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H3C | HDM Family-A G5 | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H3c | Hdm Family-a G5 |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.098% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
H3c
H3c hdm Family-a G5 |
|
| Vendors & Products |
H3c
H3c hdm Family-a G5 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `/conf/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key. This was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3/G5 builds carrying the Redfish/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding. | |
| Title | H3C G3/G5 HDM Firmware Verification Key Replacement | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|