Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| yeti-platform | yeti | affected |
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No data.
No data.
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| Yeti-platform | Yeti |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.412% probability within 30 days)
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ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Yeti-platform
Yeti-platform yeti |
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| Vendors & Products |
Yeti-platform
Yeti-platform yeti |
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| Description | Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1. | |
| Title | Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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