draw.io: SSRF via DNS rebinding in ProxyServlet bypasses private IP blocklist
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| jgraph | drawio | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jgraph | Drawio |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.315% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Jgraph
Jgraph drawio |
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| Vendors & Products |
Jgraph
Jgraph drawio |
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| Description | draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.7, deployments with ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1 are vulnerable to server-side request forgery because src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java performs the private-address check in Utils.sanitizeUrl() using one DNS resolution, while src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/ProxyServlet.java later calls URL.openConnection() and performs a second resolution. An attacker-controlled hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and then to a private, link-local, or cloud metadata address when the connection is opened. Successful exploitation can return cloud instance metadata or responses from internal HTTP services through the proxy. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.7. | |
| Title | draw.io: SSRF via DNS rebinding in ProxyServlet bypasses private IP blocklist | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-367 CWE-918 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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