Unauthenticated HTTP File Download Exposure in Eclipse Theia
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | Eclipse Theia | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse | Theia |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.533% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Unauthenticated HTTP File Download Exposure in Eclipse Theia | |
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Eclipse
Eclipse theia |
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| Vendors & Products |
Eclipse
Eclipse theia |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the `@theia/filesystem` backend exposes HTTP file-download endpoints (`GET /file`, `GET /files/`, `PUT /files/`) that convert a client-supplied URI directly to a filesystem path and stream the file, without confining it to the workspace or any allow-listed root. In browser (non-Electron) deployments the connection token is enforced only on WebSocket upgrades; the HTTP middleware in `@theia/core` re-issues the cookie and calls `next()` without rejecting tokenless HTTP requests, so these endpoints are reachable without a valid token. As a result an unauthenticated client can read any file readable by the backend process, including files outside the opened workspace (for example `/etc/hosts`, SSH keys, or tokens). Electron mode uses a separate `ElectronSecurityToken` and is not affected via this path. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-200 CWE-22 CWE-306 CWE-36 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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