CVE-2026-58481

Network-AI: AgentRuntime sandbox path-prefix checks allow file access outside the configured base directory

Published Jul 20, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Network-ai
Network-ai network-ai
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Network-ai
Network-ai network-ai
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Jovancoding
Jovancoding network-ai
Vendors & Products Jovancoding
Jovancoding network-ai
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope.
Title Network-AI: AgentRuntime sandbox path-prefix checks allow file access outside the configured base directory
Weaknesses CWE-22
CWE-23
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Jul 20, 2026, 5:42 PM
Reserved
Jun 30, 2026, 8:21 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Jul 20, 2026, 5:18 PM
Modified
Oct 24, 2026, 8:10 PM