CVE-2026-58202

OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`

Published Oct 23, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 8.3 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Open-reception
Open-reception appointment-booking-software
Vendors & Products Open-reception
Open-reception appointment-booking-software
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.
Title OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`
Weaknesses CWE-640
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 29, 2026, 6:16 PM
Reserved
Jun 29, 2026, 5:09 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 23, 2026, 9:17 PM
Modified
Oct 29, 2026, 7:17 PM