CVE-2026-57586

CodeRAG: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution

Published Sep 15, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 8.6 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Naranor
Naranor agent-coderag
Vendors & Products Naranor
Naranor agent-coderag
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.
Title CodeRAG: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution
Weaknesses CWE-78
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Sep 15, 2026, 6:03 PM
Reserved
Jun 24, 2026, 6:49 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Sep 15, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Sep 30, 2026, 5:51 PM