CodeRAG: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| naranor | agent-coderag | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Naranor | Agent-coderag |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.214% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Naranor
Naranor agent-coderag |
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| Vendors & Products |
Naranor
Naranor agent-coderag |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1. | |
| Title | CodeRAG: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-78 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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