CVE-2026-57171

Trestle is vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in author generate commands (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46345)

Published Aug 25, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.7 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate author commands write generated Markdown to an attacker-influenced output path without path-traversal validation, allowing arbitrary file write outside the Trestle workspace. These commands join the user-supplied output argument onto the Trestle root and write to the result, but guard it only with an is_directory_name_allowed() task-name-collision check rather than the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard used by the jinja command, so an absolute path or one containing traversal sequences escapes the workspace and writes files under an attacker-chosen location as the invoking process owner. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted CI job, shared service, or wrapper derives the output argument from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting output to stay inside the workspace. When --force-overwrite is used, the selected output directory is first recursively deleted, extending the primitive to destruction of an attacker-chosen directory tree and enabling indirect code execution by overwriting files a pipeline later runs. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-r4vp-3vw6-r2x5 Trestle is vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in author generate commands (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46345)
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

threat_severity

Important

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Oscal-compass
Oscal-compass compliance-trestle
Vendors & Products Oscal-compass
Oscal-compass compliance-trestle
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate author commands write generated Markdown to an attacker-influenced output path without path-traversal validation, allowing arbitrary file write outside the Trestle workspace. These commands join the user-supplied output argument onto the Trestle root and write to the result, but guard it only with an is_directory_name_allowed() task-name-collision check rather than the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard used by the jinja command, so an absolute path or one containing traversal sequences escapes the workspace and writes files under an attacker-chosen location as the invoking process owner. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted CI job, shared service, or wrapper derives the output argument from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting output to stay inside the workspace. When --force-overwrite is used, the selected output directory is first recursively deleted, extending the primitive to destruction of an attacker-chosen directory tree and enabling indirect code execution by overwriting files a pipeline later runs. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.
Title Trestle is vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in author generate commands (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46345)
Weaknesses CWE-22
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Aug 27, 2026, 2:34 PM
Reserved
Jun 24, 2026, 1:47 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 26, 2026, 5:18 AM
Modified
Sep 9, 2026, 9:09 PM
Severity
Important
Public date
Aug 25, 2026, 11:39 PM