CVE-2026-57114

PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding

Published Oct 23, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.2 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai
Vendors & Products Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
Title PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
Weaknesses CWE-367
CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 29, 2026, 1:09 PM
Reserved
Jun 24, 2026, 12:33 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 23, 2026, 1:17 PM
Modified
Oct 29, 2026, 2:17 PM