wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() reports success for degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 with no signer
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL | wolfSSL | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wolfssl | Wolfssl |
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DLA |
DLA-4683-1 | wolfssl security update |
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.146% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl |
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| Vendors & Products |
Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles. | |
| Title | wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() reports success for degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 with no signer | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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