Crater - Missing Tenant-Ownership Check in CustomerPolicy Allows Cross-Company Customer Data Theft and Deletion
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| crater-invoice | Crater | unknown |
|
No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crater-invoice-inc | Crater |
|
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.374% probability within 30 days)
| Link | Providers |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/crater-invoice/crater |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Crater isolates data per company_id, and its Invoice/Estimate/Payment/Expense policies enforce both a Bouncer ability check and $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). CustomerPolicy's view/update/delete methods omit the company-ownership check entirely, checking only the blanket ability. Route-model-bound customer lookups and the bulk Customer::deleteCustomers() method are similarly unscoped (self::find($id) with no company filter). Any authenticated user of one company can read, reassign (steal), or delete another company's customer records, with deletion cascading to that customer's invoices and payments. | Crater isolates data per company_id, and its Invoice/Estimate/Payment/Expense policies enforce both a Bouncer ability check and ->hasCompany(->company_id). CustomerPolicy's view/update/delete methods omit the company-ownership check entirely, checking only the blanket ability. Route-model-bound customer lookups and the bulk Customer::deleteCustomers method are similarly unscoped (self::find with no company filter). |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Crater: Missing Tenant-Ownership Check in CustomerPolicy Allows Cross-Company Customer Data Theft and Deletion | Crater - Missing Tenant-Ownership Check in CustomerPolicy Allows Cross-Company Customer Data Theft and Deletion |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Crater-invoice-inc
Crater-invoice-inc crater |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Crater-invoice-inc
Crater-invoice-inc crater |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Crater isolates data per company_id, and its Invoice/Estimate/Payment/Expense policies enforce both a Bouncer ability check and $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). CustomerPolicy's view/update/delete methods omit the company-ownership check entirely, checking only the blanket ability. Route-model-bound customer lookups and the bulk Customer::deleteCustomers() method are similarly unscoped (self::find($id) with no company filter). Any authenticated user of one company can read, reassign (steal), or delete another company's customer records, with deletion cascading to that customer's invoices and payments. | |
| Title | Crater: Missing Tenant-Ownership Check in CustomerPolicy Allows Cross-Company Customer Data Theft and Deletion | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|