Stack Buffer Overflow in rxi/microtar raw_to_header() via non-null-terminated TAR name field
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rxi | microtar | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rxi | Microtar |
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No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.398% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the raw_to_header() function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0. The function copies the 100-byte name and linkname fields of a TAR header with strcpy() without guaranteeing null termination of the source. The POSIX ustar format permits these fixed-width fields to be fully populated with non-null bytes, so a crafted archive whose linkname field (followed by the trailing padding of the 512-byte raw header) contains no null terminator causes strcpy() to read past the end of the 512-byte raw header stack buffer and to write past the destination header buffer. A remote attacker who supplies a crafted TAR archive that the victim opens or parses (via mtar_open(), mtar_read_header(), or mtar_find()) can cause an out-of-bounds read and a stack buffer overflow, resulting in denial of service (crash) and potentially arbitrary code execution. Confirmed with AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow READ of size 356 in raw_to_header at src/microtar.c:112. | A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the raw_to_header function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0. The function copies the 100-byte name and linkname fields of a TAR header with strcpy without guaranteeing null termination of the source. |
| Title | rxi microtar - Stack Buffer Overflow in raw_to_header() via Non-Null-Terminated TAR Name Field | Stack Buffer Overflow in rxi/microtar raw_to_header() via non-null-terminated TAR name field |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Stack Buffer Overflow in rxi/microtar raw_to_header() via non-null-terminated TAR name field | rxi microtar - Stack Buffer Overflow in raw_to_header() via Non-Null-Terminated TAR Name Field |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Rxi
Rxi microtar |
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| Vendors & Products |
Rxi
Rxi microtar |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the raw_to_header() function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0. The function copies the 100-byte name and linkname fields of a TAR header with strcpy() without guaranteeing null termination of the source. The POSIX ustar format permits these fixed-width fields to be fully populated with non-null bytes, so a crafted archive whose linkname field (followed by the trailing padding of the 512-byte raw header) contains no null terminator causes strcpy() to read past the end of the 512-byte raw header stack buffer and to write past the destination header buffer. A remote attacker who supplies a crafted TAR archive that the victim opens or parses (via mtar_open(), mtar_read_header(), or mtar_find()) can cause an out-of-bounds read and a stack buffer overflow, resulting in denial of service (crash) and potentially arbitrary code execution. Confirmed with AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow READ of size 356 in raw_to_header at src/microtar.c:112. | |
| Title | Stack Buffer Overflow in rxi/microtar raw_to_header() via non-null-terminated TAR name field | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-121 CWE-170 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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