CVE-2026-55524

PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)

Published Aug 5, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai
Vendors & Products Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.
Title PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)
Weaknesses CWE-367
CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Aug 6, 2026, 2:43 PM
Reserved
Jun 16, 2026, 10:44 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Aug 5, 2026, 8:17 PM
Modified
Oct 24, 2026, 4:10 PM