SSRF via DNS-resolution gap in _validate_url_security (file download by URL)
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| leshchenko1979 | fast-mcp-telegram | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Leshchenko1979 | Fast-mcp-telegram |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.254% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Leshchenko1979
Leshchenko1979 fast-mcp-telegram |
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| Vendors & Products |
Leshchenko1979
Leshchenko1979 fast-mcp-telegram |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, the send_message/send_message_to_phone MCP tools accept files as a list of http(s) URLs, which the server downloads and attaches to the outgoing Telegram message. Downloads are guarded by _validate_url_security, an SSRF denylist that checks the URL's literal hostname string but never resolves DNS. The fetch (httpx.AsyncClient.get) does its own resolution at request time. Consequently a hostname that resolves to a loopback / private / link-local address passes the guard and is fetched — even with the secure defaults block_private_ips=True and allow_http_urls=False. Because the fetched body is returned to the attacker as a Telegram file attachment, this is a full-read, exfiltrating SSRF, not blind. This issue has been patched in version 30.1. | |
| Title | SSRF via DNS-resolution gap in _validate_url_security (file download by URL) | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-184 CWE-918 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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