Kitodo.Production: XXE in XMLUtils EAD/XML upload parsers (parseXMLString / getNumberOfEADElements / checkIfXmlIsWellFormed lack secure JAXP config)
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| kitodo | kitodo-production | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
No data available yet.
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.304% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Kitodo.Production is a workflow management tool for mass digitization and is part of the Kitodo Digital Library Suite. Prior to version 3.9.2, org.kitodo.production.helper.XMLUtils exposes several XML parsing helpers that construct a JAXP parser with the default, non-secure configuration. The methods parseXMLString(String), getNumberOfEADElements(String, String) and checkIfXmlIsWellFormed(String) build a DocumentBuilderFactory / XMLInputFactory / SAXParserFactory via newInstance() and parse the attacker-supplied string without disabling DOCTYPE declarations or external entity resolution. These helpers sit directly on the EAD-import path: an authenticated user who uploads an EAD/XML file through the "Create process" file-upload dialog has the uploaded bytes parsed by these methods. A crafted document with an external entity therefore yields XML External Entity (XXE) injection: local file disclosure and outbound SSRF requests from the server. This issue has been patched in version 3.9.2. | |
| Title | Kitodo.Production: XXE in XMLUtils EAD/XML upload parsers (parseXMLString / getNumberOfEADElements / checkIfXmlIsWellFormed lack secure JAXP config) | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-611 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
No data.