CVE-2026-54668

Kitodo.Production: XXE in XMLUtils EAD/XML upload parsers (parseXMLString / getNumberOfEADElements / checkIfXmlIsWellFormed lack secure JAXP config)

Published Oct 23, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Kitodo.Production is a workflow management tool for mass digitization and is part of the Kitodo Digital Library Suite. Prior to version 3.9.2, org.kitodo.production.helper.XMLUtils exposes several XML parsing helpers that construct a JAXP parser with the default, non-secure configuration. The methods parseXMLString(String), getNumberOfEADElements(String, String) and checkIfXmlIsWellFormed(String) build a DocumentBuilderFactory / XMLInputFactory / SAXParserFactory via newInstance() and parse the attacker-supplied string without disabling DOCTYPE declarations or external entity resolution. These helpers sit directly on the EAD-import path: an authenticated user who uploads an EAD/XML file through the "Create process" file-upload dialog has the uploaded bytes parsed by these methods. A crafted document with an external entity therefore yields XML External Entity (XXE) injection: local file disclosure and outbound SSRF requests from the server. This issue has been patched in version 3.9.2.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Kitodo.Production is a workflow management tool for mass digitization and is part of the Kitodo Digital Library Suite. Prior to version 3.9.2, org.kitodo.production.helper.XMLUtils exposes several XML parsing helpers that construct a JAXP parser with the default, non-secure configuration. The methods parseXMLString(String), getNumberOfEADElements(String, String) and checkIfXmlIsWellFormed(String) build a DocumentBuilderFactory / XMLInputFactory / SAXParserFactory via newInstance() and parse the attacker-supplied string without disabling DOCTYPE declarations or external entity resolution. These helpers sit directly on the EAD-import path: an authenticated user who uploads an EAD/XML file through the "Create process" file-upload dialog has the uploaded bytes parsed by these methods. A crafted document with an external entity therefore yields XML External Entity (XXE) injection: local file disclosure and outbound SSRF requests from the server. This issue has been patched in version 3.9.2.
Title Kitodo.Production: XXE in XMLUtils EAD/XML upload parsers (parseXMLString / getNumberOfEADElements / checkIfXmlIsWellFormed lack secure JAXP config)
Weaknesses CWE-611
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

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Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Oct 29, 2026, 2:11 PM
Reserved
Jun 15, 2026, 10:53 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Oct 23, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Oct 29, 2026, 3:17 PM