wc_VerifyEccsiHash missing sanity check
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL | wolfSSL | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wolfssl | Wolfssl |
|
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.197% probability within 30 days)
| Link | Providers |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/wolfssl/wolfssl/pull/10102 |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | wolfSSL's ECCSI signature verifier `wc_VerifyEccsiHash` decodes the `r` and `s` scalars from the signature blob via `mp_read_unsigned_bin` with no check that they lie in `[1, q-1]`. A crafted forged signature could verify against any message for any identity, using only publicly-known constants. | |
| Title | wc_VerifyEccsiHash missing sanity check | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|