Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rxi | microtar | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rxi | Microtar |
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No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.417% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | An integer overflow in the mtar_next() function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next() computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic. When the header size field is a multiple of 512 in the range 0xFFFFFC01-0xFFFFFE00 (e.g. 0xFFFFFE00), the addition wraps to 0, so mtar_next() seeks to the current record position instead of advancing. As a result, mtar_find() and any loop that iterates entries with mtar_next() repeat indefinitely over the same record, hanging the process at 100% CPU with no recovery. | An integer overflow in the mtar_next function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic. |
| Title | rxi microtar - Integer Overflow in mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS | Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS | rxi microtar - Integer Overflow in mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Rxi
Rxi microtar |
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| Vendors & Products |
Rxi
Rxi microtar |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | An integer overflow in the mtar_next() function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next() computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic. When the header size field is a multiple of 512 in the range 0xFFFFFC01-0xFFFFFE00 (e.g. 0xFFFFFE00), the addition wraps to 0, so mtar_next() seeks to the current record position instead of advancing. As a result, mtar_find() and any loop that iterates entries with mtar_next() repeat indefinitely over the same record, hanging the process at 100% CPU with no recovery. | |
| Title | Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-190 CWE-835 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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