CVE-2026-54417

Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS

Published Jun 17, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
An integer overflow in the mtar_next function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description An integer overflow in the mtar_next() function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next() computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic. When the header size field is a multiple of 512 in the range 0xFFFFFC01-0xFFFFFE00 (e.g. 0xFFFFFE00), the addition wraps to 0, so mtar_next() seeks to the current record position instead of advancing. As a result, mtar_find() and any loop that iterates entries with mtar_next() repeat indefinitely over the same record, hanging the process at 100% CPU with no recovery. An integer overflow in the mtar_next function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic.
Title rxi microtar - Integer Overflow in mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS rxi microtar - Integer Overflow in mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Rxi
Rxi microtar
Vendors & Products Rxi
Rxi microtar
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description An integer overflow in the mtar_next() function in src/microtar.c in rxi microtar 0.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (uncontrolled CPU consumption / infinite loop) via a crafted tar archive. mtar_next() computes the offset to the next record as round_up(h.size, 512) + sizeof(mtar_raw_header_t) using 32-bit arithmetic. When the header size field is a multiple of 512 in the range 0xFFFFFC01-0xFFFFFE00 (e.g. 0xFFFFFE00), the addition wraps to 0, so mtar_next() seeks to the current record position instead of advancing. As a result, mtar_find() and any loop that iterates entries with mtar_next() repeat indefinitely over the same record, hanging the process at 100% CPU with no recovery.
Title Integer Overflow in rxi/microtar mtar_next() Causes Infinite Loop DoS
Weaknesses CWE-190
CWE-835
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
TuranSec
Published
Updated
Aug 10, 2026, 11:44 AM
Reserved
Jun 13, 2026, 4:39 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Jun 17, 2026, 2:17 PM
Modified
Oct 26, 2026, 11:10 AM