Budibase: Potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| Budibase | budibase | affected |
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No data.
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| Budibase | Budibase |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf | @budibase/backend-core has potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.213% probability within 30 days)
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ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Budibase
Budibase budibase |
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| Vendors & Products |
Budibase
Budibase budibase |
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| Description | Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9. | |
| Title | Budibase: Potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-367 CWE-918 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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