Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated Persistent Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via Orbital Data Source URL
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Efstratios Goudelis | Ground Station | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Efstratios Goudelis | Ground Station |
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No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.574% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Efstratios Goudelis
Efstratios Goudelis ground Station |
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| Vendors & Products |
Efstratios Goudelis
Efstratios Goudelis ground Station |
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| Description | Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected. | |
| Title | Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated Persistent Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via Orbital Data Source URL | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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