Gardens v2: Permissionless syncOutflow bypasses streaming proposal disputes
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| 1Hive | gardens-v2 | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1hive | Gardens-v2 |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.406% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
1hive
1hive gardens-v2 |
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| Vendors & Products |
1hive
1hive gardens-v2 |
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| Description | Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. Prior to 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9, StreamingEscrow.claim() correctly rejects withdrawals while an escrow is disputed, but the permissionless syncOutflow() path performs the same excess-balance transfer without checking disputed. After a streaming proposal is challenged, anyone can call syncOutflow() to transfer escrowed SuperTokens to the proposal beneficiary while the dispute is pending. If the proposal is later rejected, those tokens cannot be recovered by drainToStrategy(). This issue has been patched in 0xc9d4e0dacd937364793278180551e59d93cd43f9. | |
| Title | Gardens v2: Permissionless syncOutflow bypasses streaming proposal disputes | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-284 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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