Missing one-time-use enforcement in Samly allows replay of SAML bearer assertions
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| dropbox | samly | unaffected |
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| dropbox | samly | unaffected |
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| handnot2 | samly | unaffected |
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No data.
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| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||||||
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| Dropbox | Samly |
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| Dropbox | Samly |
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| Dropbox | Samly |
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| Handnot2 | Samly |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.602% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Description | Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it. Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject. This issue affects samly: from v0.3.0 onward. | Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it. Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject. This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward. |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it. Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject. This issue affects samly: from v0.3.0 onward. | |
| Title | Missing one-time-use enforcement in Samly allows replay of SAML bearer assertions | |
| First Time appeared |
Dropbox
Dropbox samly Handnot2 Handnot2 samly |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-294 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:dropbox:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:a:handnot2:samly:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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| Vendors & Products |
Dropbox
Dropbox samly Handnot2 Handnot2 samly |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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