ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| ZcashFoundation | zebra | affected |
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| ZcashFoundation | zebra-state | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Zcashfoundation | Zebra |
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| Zcashfoundation | Zebra-state |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w | Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks |
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.507% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Zcashfoundation
Zcashfoundation zebra Zcashfoundation zebra-state |
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| Vendors & Products |
Zcashfoundation
Zcashfoundation zebra Zcashfoundation zebra-state |
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| Description | ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0. | |
| Title | ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-248 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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