Ingenic T31 Boot ROM Secure-Boot Verification Flaw Allows Firmware Forgery
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | n/a | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Opensensor | Ingenic T31 |
|
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.127% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Ingenic T31 Boot ROM Secure-Boot Verification Flaw Allows Firmware Forgery |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Partial RSA Signature Verification in Ingenic T31 Secure Boot Allows Forgery | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-20 CWE-330 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Opensensor
Opensensor ingenic T31 |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Opensensor
Opensensor ingenic T31 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Partial RSA Signature Verification in Ingenic T31 Secure Boot Allows Forgery | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-20 CWE-330 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Ingenic T31 Boot ROM Allows Forged Secure Boot Images with 67% Success Rate | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-307 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Ingenic T31 Boot ROM Allows Forged Secure Boot Images with 67% Success Rate | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-307 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Ingenic T31 SoC boot ROM flash-boot verification path compares only a single 32-bit word of the RSA signature output against a single 32-bit word of the SHA-256 payload digest, rather than compare the full data. This allows an attacker with physical write access to boot media to forge modified SPL (Secondary Program Loader) images that pass secure boot verification without possession of the OEM signing key. Each forgery attempt succeeds with approximately 2/3 probability. This has been validated via reverse engineering, software emulation against vendor-signed images, and end-to-end hardware acceptance of a forged firmware image on a Wyze Video Doorbell v2 (T31X). | |
| References |
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