Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | n/a | affected |
|
No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Opensensor | Ingenic T31 |
|
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.147% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Secure Boot Bypass via Init Table Parsing in Ingenic T41/T32/T40/A1 SoCs | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-287 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-284 CWE-347 CWE-474 |
|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Opensensor
Opensensor ingenic T31 |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Opensensor
Opensensor ingenic T31 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Secure Boot Bypass via Init Table Parsing in Ingenic T41/T32/T40/A1 SoCs | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-287 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Secure Boot Bypass via Erroneous Init Table Order in Ingenic T41/T32/T40/A1 SoCs | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-287 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Secure Boot Bypass via Erroneous Init Table Order in Ingenic T41/T32/T40/A1 SoCs | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-287 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Ingenic T41, and probably also T32, T40, and A1 SoC boot ROMs parse and execute an attacker-controlled init table from the SPL header before checking the secure boot state and before invoking signature verification. The init table parser supports full-address 32-bit write operations, allowing modification of SRAM-resident secure boot state prior to the verification decision. An attacker with physical write access to boot media can inject an init-table entry that disables the secure boot check, causing the ROM to accept unsigned or modified first-stage boot code. This has been hardware-validated on a secureboot-enabled T41 device; ROM analysis confirms closely related behavior on T32, T40, and A1. | |
| References |
|