CVE-2026-49943

bird: BIRD Internet Routing Daemon: Denial of Service via stack-based buffer overflow in BGP AS_PATH processing

Published Jun 2, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 6.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon through 2.19.0 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP AS_PATH mask matching implementation in nest/a-path.c. The as_path_match() function uses a fixed-size stack array of 2048 + 1 pm_pos entries, while parse_path() expands AS_PATH segments from a received BGP UPDATE without enforcing a corresponding capacity limit. When RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages are enabled and a BIRD filter evaluates an AS path mask expression such as "bgp_path ~ [= ... =]", an established BGP peer can send a long AS_PATH containing more than 2048 expanded ASNs. This causes parse_path()/as_path_match() to write beyond the fixed stack buffer, resulting in a crash of the daemon. NOTE: reportedly, the Supplier's position is that a fix is not being prioritized because all network operators should already be rejecting routes with unusually long attributes.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Stack‑Based Buffer Overflow in BIRD's AS_PATH Mask Matching Leading to Daemon Crash bird: BIRD Internet Routing Daemon: Denial of Service via stack-based buffer overflow in BGP AS_PATH processing
Weaknesses CWE-120
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Moderate

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Stack‑Based Buffer Overflow in BIRD's AS_PATH Mask Matching Leading to Daemon Crash
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description CZ.NIC BIRD Internet Routing Daemon through 2.19.0 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP AS_PATH mask matching implementation in nest/a-path.c. The as_path_match() function uses a fixed-size stack array of 2048 + 1 pm_pos entries, while parse_path() expands AS_PATH segments from a received BGP UPDATE without enforcing a corresponding capacity limit. When RFC 8654 BGP Extended Messages are enabled and a BIRD filter evaluates an AS path mask expression such as "bgp_path ~ [= ... =]", an established BGP peer can send a long AS_PATH containing more than 2048 expanded ASNs. This causes parse_path()/as_path_match() to write beyond the fixed stack buffer, resulting in a crash of the daemon. NOTE: reportedly, the Supplier's position is that a fix is not being prioritized because all network operators should already be rejecting routes with unusually long attributes.
First Time appeared Nic
Nic bird
Weaknesses CWE-121
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:nic:bird:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Nic
Nic bird
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 6.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
mitre
Published
Updated
Jun 2, 2026, 6:24 PM
Reserved
Jun 2, 2026, 4:16 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Jun 2, 2026, 5:16 PM
Modified
Jul 22, 2026, 7:10 PM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
Jun 2, 2026, 4:16 PM