Jellyfin: Potential MKV attachment filename path traversal to RCE
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| jellyfin | jellyfin | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jellyfin | Jellyfin |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.370% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Jellyfin
Jellyfin jellyfin |
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| Vendors & Products |
Jellyfin
Jellyfin jellyfin |
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| Description | Jellyfin is an open source self hosted media server. Prior to 10.11.10, a specifically crafted MKV file containing forged filename tags can be leveraged to exploit missing path sanitization during playback. Jellyfin treats the MKV file name tag on MKV attachments as trusted and passes it unsanitized into Path.Combine(attachmentFolder, fileName) inside PathManager.GetAttachmentPath. Because .NET's Path.Combine neither normalises .. nor rejects a rooted second argument, a crafted MKV can redirect Jellyfin's MKV attachment extraction to any absolute path on disk. This triggers on any playback action of the affected video on a client which will attempt to burn in the subtitles by default.g This vulnerability is fixed in 10.11.10. | |
| Title | Jellyfin: Potential MKV attachment filename path traversal to RCE | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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