OS Command Injection in FastNetMon Juniper Plugin
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| n/a | n/a | affected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Pavel-odintsov | Fastnetmon |
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DSA |
DSA-6375-1 | fastnetmon security update |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: 1.6% (1.645% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | OS Command Injection in FastNetMon Juniper Plugin |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | OS Command Injection in FastNetMon Juniper Plugin |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:pavel-odintsov:fastnetmon:*:*:*:*:community:*:*:* | |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | OS Command Injection in FastNetMon Juniper Plugin | |
| First Time appeared |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-78 | |
| Vendors & Products |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters. | |
| References |
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