FastNetMon BGP Extended Length Parsing Flaw
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | n/a | affected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pavel-odintsov | Fastnetmon |
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DSA |
DSA-6375-1 | fastnetmon security update |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.295% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:pavel-odintsov:fastnetmon:*:*:*:*:community:*:*:* |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | FastNetMon BGP Extended Length Parsing Flaw |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | FastNetMon Community Edition BGP Attribute Length Parsing Vulnerability Causing OOB Access | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-119 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-130 | |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | FastNetMon Community Edition BGP Attribute Length Parsing Vulnerability Causing OOB Access | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-119 |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 has out-of-bounds memory access because it incorrectly parses BGP path attributes with the extended length flag set. In src/bgp_protocol.hpp, the parse_raw_bgp_attribute() function correctly identifies when extended_length_bit is set and sets length_of_length_field to 2, but then reads only a single byte for the attribute value length (attribute_value_length = value[2] at line 173). Per RFC 4271 Section 4.3, when the Extended Length bit is set, the Attribute Length field is two octets and the value should be read as a 16-bit big-endian integer from value[2] and value[3]. As a result, any attribute longer than 255 bytes has its length silently truncated to the low byte (e.g., 300 bytes = 0x012C is read as 0x2C = 44 bytes). The remaining 256 bytes are then misinterpreted as subsequent attributes, causing cascading parse failures and potential out-of-bounds memory access. | |
| References |
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