CVE-2026-48682

Published Jun 2, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an out-of-bounds read in the IPv4 packet parser. In src/simple_packet_parser_ng.cpp, after validating that the packet contains at least sizeof(ipv4_header_t) bytes (20 bytes), the code advances the local_pointer by '4 * ipv4_header->get_ihl()' (line 164) without validating that (a) IHL >= 5 (the minimum valid value per RFC 791), or (b) 4 * IHL bytes are actually available in the packet. The IHL field is 4 bits, allowing values 0-15, so the advance can be 0-60 bytes. An IHL value of 15 with only 20 bytes validated causes a 40-byte over-read. An IHL of 0-4 causes the pointer to not advance past the IP header, resulting in the TCP/UDP header being parsed from IP header data (type confusion). This vulnerability is reachable via any packet capture interface.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title FastNetMon Community Edition IPv4 Parser Out‑Bounds Read Leading to Potential Information Disclosure
Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-843 CWE-125
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Title FastNetMon Community Edition IPv4 Parser Out‑Bounds Read Leading to Potential Information Disclosure
Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-843
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon
Vendors & Products Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an out-of-bounds read in the IPv4 packet parser. In src/simple_packet_parser_ng.cpp, after validating that the packet contains at least sizeof(ipv4_header_t) bytes (20 bytes), the code advances the local_pointer by '4 * ipv4_header->get_ihl()' (line 164) without validating that (a) IHL >= 5 (the minimum valid value per RFC 791), or (b) 4 * IHL bytes are actually available in the packet. The IHL field is 4 bits, allowing values 0-15, so the advance can be 0-60 bytes. An IHL value of 15 with only 20 bytes validated causes a 40-byte over-read. An IHL of 0-4 causes the pointer to not advance past the IP header, resulting in the TCP/UDP header being parsed from IP header data (type confusion). This vulnerability is reachable via any packet capture interface.
References
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
mitre
Published
Updated
Jun 4, 2026, 1:21 PM
Reserved
May 22, 2026, 12:00 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Jun 2, 2026, 8:16 PM
Modified
Jul 22, 2026, 7:10 PM